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Publications concerned with the foundations of measurement often accept uncritically 
the theory/observation and the norm/fact distinction. However, measurement is 
measurement-in-a-context. This is analysed in the first part of the paper. Important 
aspects of this context are: the purpose of the particular measurement; everything we 
know; everything we can do; and the empirical world. Dichotomies, such as definition 
versus empirica//aw, are by themselves not very useful because the 'rules of measure- 
ment' are facts or norms depending on the context chosen or considered. In the second 
part of the paper, three methodological premises for a theory of measurement are 
advocated: reduce arbitrariness, against fundamentalism, and do not be afraid of 
realism. 
The problem of dichotomies 
In the literature on the foundations of measurement, a 
number of dichotomies are used in describing properties of 
statements about various aspects of measurement. One of 
the most common distinctions is that between a convention 
and an empirical fact, or between an (a priori) definition 
and an (a posterior/) empirical aw. Some other dichotomies 
that roughly correspond to the two just mentioned are 
given in Table 1. The following are examples of statements 
to which these dichotomies have been applied: 
• Electric conductivity is the inverse of electric resistance 
(Krantz et al, 1971) 
• Density is mass divided by volume (Krantz et al, 1971; 
Grunstra, 1969; Osborne, 1976) 
• Force is mass times acceleration (Nagel, 1968; Palacios, 
1964; Gillies, 1973) 
• Many cyclic processes in nature are isochronic (Christen- 
sen, 1977; Roxburgh, 1977; Janich, 1969) 
• All electrons have equal charge (Hanson, 1959) 
• A transported rod is of equal length everywhere 
(Reichenbach, 1957; Jammer, 1959; Grtinbaum, 1968; 
Balzer and Kamlah, 1980) 
• Physical quantities are continuous (Poincarr6, 1917; 
Schleichert, 1966) 
• Physical quantities are dimensionally homogeneous 
(Krantz et al, 1971; Palacios, 1964; Luce, 1976; 
Roberts, 1980; Post, 1982) 
• Coulomb's 'electrostatic density of charge' and Ohm's 
'electroscopic force' refer to the same physical quantity 
(Heidelberger, 1980) 
TABLE 1: Dichotomies relating to the semantic or epistemological 
status of statements about (properties of) quantities 
a prior/  a posterior/ 
analytic 
normative, prescriptive 
rule, definition, principle 
mathematical, ogical, formal 
coherence; form 
convention, norm, value* 
convenient or rational choice 
synthetic 
descriptive, empirical 
empirical law 
empirical 
correspondence; content 
fact 
inductive or empirical support 
*Also: arbitraryL convention, pragmatic (convenient) convention, 
ethical convention (or principle). 
• Extensive quantities are additive (mass, velocity, utility) 
• The empirical relation > (for mass, length, temperature, 
. . . )  is transitive (Schleichert, 1966; Carnap, 1926; 
Janich et al, 1974) 
• The existence of an absolute unit for velocity (a maxi- 
mum velocity) (Wehl, 1949) 
• The existence of an absolute zero for temperature 
These are examples of statements for which it is not 
self-evident whether they are true (or false) by agreement a 
priori or true (or false) by virtue of inductive support 
obtained a posterior/. The references in brackets refer to 
literature where we can find arguments upporting any of 
these sides. Some of the statements will be discussed in 
more detail below. 
A related set of dichotomies is used with respect o the 
status of quantities and the properties of their scales. Per- 
haps the common denominator of this set of dichotomies i
the distinction between what is basic (natural, necessary) 
and what are arbitrary (derived, inessential) additions. 
Some other related dichotomies are listed in Table 2. 
What is there to be said about these dichotomies? What 
is the meaning of the terms listed in the two tables in con- 
nection with measurement? Along what lines should we 
discuss the apparent disagreements about what is fact and 
what is norm, or about whether there is a need for basic, 
natural, absolute or fundamental quantities or units? What 
is the relevance of worrying about this in the first place? It 
would be a terrible job to analyse all details of these dicho- 
tomies. Moreover, it would be the wrong approach, I think, 
because the primary question to ask is: what precisely is 
the subject of discourse in which these dichotomies appear? 
Superficial confusions can be cleared up by stating that 
measurement theory is a semantic theory. That is to say, 
measurement is considered as some sort of general/sat/on of
giving names. By distinguishing carefully between defining 
TABLE 2: Dichotomies relating to quantities and 
special scale values (zero and unit) 
primary, basic fundamental secondary, derived 
independent, direct dependent, indirect 
absolute, natural arbitrary 
necessary convenient 
essential inessential 
Measurement Vol 2 No 1, Jan--Mar 1984 45 
van Brake/ 
the concept of measurement and carrying out measure- 
ments, some order can be created. However, this approach 
only clears up some structural (if you want, 'logical') 
aspects of measurement. What is still left out is that, in the 
end, measurement is a social act. Measurement is carried 
out in a context and a measurer is just like any other deci- 
sion maker: he ought to select what best serves his 
purposes. Apart from the formal aspects of the metric used, 
measurement includes operational and teleological aspects 
(Churchman, 1949 ;Adams, 1979; Gonella, 1983). 
The  context  
Hence the crucial point is to start with the perspective 
that measurement is a rational activity in a context. A num- 
ber of aspects of this context are of prime importance: 
(a) What is the purpose of the measurement (teleological 
aspect)? 
(b) What theoretical assumptions are given (theoretical 
aspect)? 
(c) What are the limitations of human capabilities (opera- 
tional aspect)? 
(d) What are the properties of the world around us (empiri- 
cal aspect?) 
This whole context is, of course, dependent on the 
general historical and cultural context - but space does not 
permit a discussion of these aspects here. Aspects of (a) -  
(d) together determine the rules of the game in the context 
concerned. Let us see how the perspective of measurement- 
in-a-context elucidates ome aspects of measurement. 
(a) The purpose of measurement 
The purpose of measurement can be quite varied, 
although (without going into much detail) the following 
distinctions can be made (Kuhn, 1961): 
(i) to gather factual information to be inserted in scienti- 
fic theories such as wavelengths and boiling points, but 
whose numerical outcome these theories to not predict; 
(ii) to develop possibilities of quantitative comparison of 
observation by developing apparatus, reducing per- 
turbing effects, and so on; more generally: to improve 
the measure of 'reasonable agreement' and to establish 
new measures of 'reasonable agreement' between 
theory and observation; 
(iii) to establish the exact quantitative relation between a 
number of variables (of which it is already known or 
hypothesised that they are related); this covers a whole 
range from finding 'true' laws, such as Boyle's law or 
Hooke's law, to the establishment of empirical corre- 
lations (often using dimensional numbers) in the tech- 
nical sciences and the use of multiple regression tech- 
niques to explore relations in large data sets (predomi- 
nantly in the social sciences, but also in factorially 
designed experiments in the applied physical sciences). 
(iv) only very rarely, in 'abnormal' situations, is the pur- 
pose of measurement the development or confirma- 
tion/falsification of new theories; and, if that is the 
case, the theoretical context of the measurement has 
usually been outlined long before. 
As has been stressed by Kuhn (1961), established quanti- 
tative anomalies, by themselves, suggest nothing (except 
trouble), whereas qualitative anomalies, by their very 
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nature, suggest at once theoretical modifications (ad hoc or 
otherwise). It is therefore a myth that numerical data are 
very likely to produce new generalisations. It is already 
clear from this very short analysis of the purpose of 
measurement that an isolated measurement result has no 
meaning: it is like an isolated 'fact' in history (Kushner, 
1972). 
(b) The theoretical context of measurement 
We will find reason to refer to this dependence all 
through this paper: but only a few remarks at the outset. 
Although measurements produce 'statements of the first 
level', that is, 'here-thus-relations', which may suggest at 
once that what physics calls an object is nothing ultimately 
but an aggregate of characteristic numbers, this is only one 
side of the coin. At this lower level, the higher theoretical 
levels are already implied or presupposed. As Cassirer 
(1956) formulated it: all physical judgements, whether 
empirical or theoretical, mutually condition and support 
one another. Perhaps two categories of theoretical assump- 
tions made in carrying out measurement can be distin- 
guished: 
(i) Firstly, the normal situation is that a quantity is 'in- 
vented' theoretically and described qualitatively 
(usually in terms of a set of ordering relationships) 
before it is or can be measured. We could here make a 
distinction between quantitating, which is an armchair 
occupation, and measuring, which is an empirical 
operation (Bunge, 1973). This might imply that the 
discovery and identification of quantities is logically 
independent of the discovery of a means of measure- 
ment, as is argued, for example, by Ellis (1966). 
(ii) Secondly, very general assumptions are presupposed 
about the structure of the world. This may refer to a 
particular case, as when we assume that melting ice 
always represents the same, constant temperature. 
Also, they can be assumptions which bear on all 
measurement: for example, the assumption of a parti- 
cular space-time structure. 
These two categories of assumptions together structure 
the idealised context in which measurement is carried out. 
(c) Limitations of our operational capabilities 
We can roughly divide these limitations into three cate- 
gories: 
(i) Our capabilities of making and doing things. The logic 
of measurement, so to say, requires us to make exact 
replicas, but we can only do that approximately. If we 
want to assess how good we are at making replicas, we 
assess that by using a particular theoretical background 
(sometimes our ability to make something with great 
exactitude is better than our ability to check this high 
accuracy). 
(ii) Our capabilities of observing differences. Using our 
senses we are able to judge whether one length is greater 
than another or that two lengths are approximately the 
same, but, merely going by our perceptions, the equiva- 
lence relation for length is not transitive - although 
the logic of measurement would like to have it that 
way. The psychology of sense perception may be more 
relevant o the foundations of measuring than is often 
assumed (Churchman, 1949; Horiuchi, 1983). 
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(iii) Limitations of time. We cannot make instantaneous 
measurements or an infinite number of measurements. 
(d) The empirical world and our 'objective', 'precise' and 
'neutral' rendering of it 
It is a myth that measurement is objective, precise, 
neutral. These notions only have meaning relative to a con- 
text: 
(i) Precision in science and technology is always relative to 
a context. In spectroscopy, the accuracy of measure- 
ment is one part in one million or better; in certain 
parts of astronomy, a measurement which is precise as 
to the order of magnitude (that is to say, at most a 
factor of ten wrong) is extremely good. It is the theory 
in the discipline concerned which tells us what is 
'precise' and what is 'reasonable agreement with what 
it should be'. It is also the theory which gives an 
account of the conceptual impression of a quantity. 
This includes such cases as the concept of temperature 
applied to a system consisting of a small number of 
molecules or the relation between different methods to 
measure stellar distances. 
(ii) In so-called 'objective' or 'neutral' measurements, in-
explicable discrepancies are often found when carried 
out at different places or times. This applies both when 
the best laboratories are involved in comparative 
measurements relative to a standard (mass, specific sur- 
face) or when 'constants of nature' are measured 
(astronomical unit, speed of light). The differences 
between measurements carried out at different places 
are considerably larger than the error bounds (obtained 
by conventional methods of estimating errors) would 
allow. Conceptual, theoretical analysis may shed light 
on these circumstances, asdistinct from collecting yet 
another set of data. 
(iii) The choice between a 'subjective' observer and an 
'objective' instrument depends on the purpose and 
context of measurement (Agazzi, 1978): "what could 
be more vital, clearer, more obvious and more subtle 
than an individual's perception . . .  an individual is 
more precise, more exact, richer than the quantitative 
expression obtained by a measuring instrument". It is 
obvious that this is a different context han usually en- 
countered in an institute of metrology. However, even 
when the quantity to be measured is an 'objective' one, 
subjective measurement may be the better option or 
the only possibility as, for example, in making esti- 
mates of the world energy consumption in the year 
2000 using a Delphi technique. 
(iv) In the physical sciences, measurements seem to be 
more neutral and objective than in the social sciences. 
In the latter case there are obvious examples that 
measurement results can only be objective relative to a 
set of normative premises. For example, the value of a 
price index number is only objective or neutral relative 
to the choice of a base period. Similarly, a poverty 
index is only objective relative to the normative prin- 
ciples that have been used to define it. Because the 
purpose of the physical sciences eems more generally 
agreed upon by natural scientists, there is perhaps less 
discussion about the justification of normative prin- 
ciples employed; but a consensus, of course, is not the 
same as being objective in some absolute or value-free 
sense. 
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How far have we come so far? We have disposed of the 
absoluteness of notions like 'exact' and 'objective' by con- 
sidering them relative to a context. 'Exact' measurement 
takes place in an 'idealised' environment - to know what 
would happen under ideal circumstances requires all the 
science we have at our disposal. Measurement is only 
'objective' in a given context and relative to a number of 
rules or assumptions which govern measurement in this con- 
text and which define what is considered to be 'objective' 
and 'precise'. These rules or assumptions are sometimes 
referred to as empirical axioms or laws of measurement, but 
also as conventions or a priori norms. An a priori norm can 
be, on the one hand, a 'completely arbitrary convention', 
or, on the other a 'value judgement'. Extreme cases are 
relatively easy to judge. The choice of a numerical represen- 
tation is arbitrary, except for considerations of convenience. 
A set of axiom systems for measuring social power or 
poverty no doubt contains value judgements; but this is not 
a sharp dichotomy, and what is a rational choice, may be 
more or less value-loaded depending on the context. 
Measurement presupposes some sort of laws or principles, 
that much is clear. But whether such laws are empirical, a 
posteriori statements for which there is inductive support 
or whether they are, in fact, a priori normative definitions 
or rules, is not clear at all. The solution for this confusion 
or ambiguity is, I think, that what a 'rational fact' is and 
what a 'rational convention' depends on the theoretical 
context chosen. In the end all measurement rules are rela- 
tive value judgements (that is, relative to the purpose of 
measurement). 
The direction of measurement 
Having eradicated most of the meaningfulness of the 
dichotomies commonly employed in analysing measure- 
ment by making these qualifications relative to the context, 
what remains? On the positive side I would like to put for- 
ward for consideration the following methodological 
criteria: 
(a) The purpose of the science of measurement is to elimi- 
nate arbitrariness by improving upon the theoretical 
complexity of measurement. However, this process of 
elimination of as many arbitrary conventions as possible 
does not lead to one necessarily best solution. 
(b) The methodology of the theory of measurement should 
be governed by an attitude of anti-fundamentalism. 
There are no sacred principles, necessary requirements, 
fundamental units, or absolute zeros. 
(c) The ontology of measurement should be moderate 
realism, partly because (as a methodological xiom) it 
takes into account the context of measurement in a 
much more realistic way than more operationalistic or
instrumentalistic stands. 
I will now discuss these three criteria in more detail, 
showing their interrelationship and giving examples in 
which the relative value of the fact-norm dichotomy or the 
fundamental-arbitrary dichotomy is displayed. 
(a) Reduce arbitrariness 
A positive requirement of the methodology of measure- 
ment is: reduce arbitrariness by developing more sophisti- 
cated theoretical accounts of the magnitudes we measure. 
Some examples are: 
(i) Reduction of the dependence of measurement (scales) 
on particular material bodies. This development can be 
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seen in the development of the units of measurements 
based on anthropomorphic entities to material stan- 
dards to theoretically based definitions (for example, 
for the unit of length). Similarly, because the choice of 
a material substance for a thermometer is arbitrary, 
one is inclined to believe that the resulting scale is of 
less theoretical significance than a temperature scale 
that would not be based on a thermometric property 
of a particular substance (Ellis, 1966: Mach, 1896: 
Ehrlich, 1982). Note that this is a methodological 
criterion aimed at furthering the theoretical content of 
the concept. It does not follow that this line is followed 
directly in the construction of measurement instru- 
ments where the operational criteria of calibration and 
accuracy predominate however, the assessment of" 
the validity of the instruments depends on the theore- 
tical developments. 
(ii) The amount of arbitrariness is reduced if quantities 
turn out to have a property of having a minimum and/ 
or a maximum. If there is both a minimum and maxi- 
mum, we may consider these values as, respectively, 
the zero and the unit. Examples are the measurement 
of angles and of velocities - and also of probability if 
we accept that to be a quantity existing in the real 
world. However, it should be stressed that a (theore- 
tical) context is involved in establishing whether 'abso- 
lute zeros' and *absolute units' exist - which is a point 
of contention subject to revision. At some point we 
may decide that, after all, there are velocities larger 
than the velocity of light or temperatures lower than 
the 'absolute zero', or electric charges that are not 
multiples of the charge of an electron. 
(iii) The measurement of many physical quantities is only 
possible relative to a co-ordinate system, which is 
thereby arbitrarily introduced into the world. For 
example, in Newtonian mechanics the notion of abso- 
lute rest only makes sense relative to an arbitrary 
choice of co-ordinate system (including arbitrarily 
chosen units of distance). We can aim at eliminating 
this arbitrariness by defining the quantities of mecha- 
nics using only relations such as 'betweenness'. But, 
again, such a reduction of arbitrariness i never valuable 
in itself but only relative to a wider scope. For example, 
the elimination of arbitrary units and arbitrary co- 
ordinate systems in giving a synthetic treatment of 
mechanics and gravitational theory is proposed by 
Field in his book Science without Numbers (Field, 
1980). Programmes which also aim at reducing arbi- 
trariness, that ask us to conceive of all physical quanti- 
ties as pure numbers, in the spirit of the old Pythago- 
rean programme (Kroon, 1971; Whyte, 1954). Other 
criteria than *reduce arbitrariness' will have to be used 
to decide between these two programmes. 
(iv) The three examples discussed above are all very much 
related to the theoretical development of a concept. 
But, in practice we should also aim at as little arbitrari- 
ness as possible that is to say, we should aim at 
giving as much theoretical justification as possible. For 
example, when correlating different factors in an 
experimental situation which is too complex to use 
already established theories, it is not uncommon to use 
any type of curve-fitting, correlation, multivariate 
analysis or linear regression model at hand. Assume 
(which is often the case) that a simple linear relation- 
ship is assumed between a concept (to be measured) 
and its indicators. Whatever the result is of the multiple 
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regression technique in exploring relations in the data, 
if no theoretical justification can be given as to why 
the relationship should be linear, any conclusion that is 
reached is dependent for its validity upon acceptance 
of this arbitrary - and therefore questionable -- 
assumption (Firestone and Chadwick, 1975). 
(b) Anti-fundamentalism 
Fundamentalism is construed here as any methodology 
which assumes that (Cassirer, 1956) (i) certain aspects of 
research ave priority above others, (ii) this priority or pre- 
cedence relieves the scientist of the obligation to investigate 
the 'lower' aspects. Examples of fundamentalistic attitudes 
are : 
(1) In a scientific discipline no contradictions whatsoever 
are allowed. 
(2) Physics is the only fundamental, exact science. A social 
science is possible only if founded on physics. 
(3) Ethical questions cannot be evaluated rationally. 
(4) A deterministic theory which explains quantum mecha- 
nics is not possible (hidden variable theories are not 
possible). 
(5) A universal and meaningful statement about ~pure' 
(subjective) states of mind does not exist. And so on. 
Examples of fundamentalistic statements with respect o 
(the possibility of) measurement are as follows: 
(1) There is a fundamental distinction between fundamen- 
tal and derived quantities in physics; the latter are only 
introduced for the sake of convenience (Ehrlich, 1982; 
Kroon, 1971). 
(2) Every measurement is a derived measurement relative 
to the measurement of length. Therefore geometry is 
the most fundamental particular theory of measure- 
ment. 
(3) One cannot find the measure of a sensation via its rela- 
tion to the physical stimulus, because, by nature, 
psychophysical magnitudes cannot be reduced to 
space-time magnitudes (Heidelberger, 1983). 
Probably the most famous and the most notorious funda- 
mentalistic stand with respect to measurement is the 
following: 
(4) Science is based on the measurement of fundamental 
quantities. A fundamental quantity is a quantity for 
which a physical concatenation procedure exists that 
leads to an additive scale and the measurement of 
which does not depend upon prior measurement 
(hence, its measurement does not depend on the 
measurement of other quantities. The trouble this 
normative demand on 'good science' has caused in the 
development of psychology has been well documented. 
Furthermore, at one time even the thermodynamic 
temperature scale was dismissed as incapable of 
measuring a 'proper' quantity (Hempel, 1952). 
Enough has been said about the relevance of the context 
of measurement to realise that the notion of measurement 
being independent of anything else is a context-free 
abstraction with little relevance to either theory or practice. 
Just two examples of the influence of the context are: 
(i) Whether the additive property of a physical magnitude 
is a matter of fact or a matter of convention depends 
on a priori theoretical considerations involving many 
different quantities. For example, the addition rule for 
velocities has been classified as both empirical (for 
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example, based on direct measurement via the Doppler 
effect) and as following logically from a priori axioms 
of measurement. Similarly, the additivity of mass is 
usually considered to be an empirical aw. However, if 
mass is defined via acceleration, the choice of an addi- 
tive scale for mass is conventional (Carnap, 1926; 
Mach, 1869). 
(ii) In the context of theoretical (as opposed to experi- 
mental) physics, it is not at all obvious that the strictly 
additive extensive magnitudes are basic. Actually the 
intensive quantities generate (by integration) extensive 
magnitudes (Bunge, 1973), rather than the other way 
round, as in m = fp (x )d3x .  
So much for the interdependence of quantities. As to 
the additivity of fundamental quantities, there seems to be 
very little to support he contention that there is something 
essential or fundamental that would justify the demand for 
basing a science on additive quantities: 
(i) In the early stages of the 'proper' measurement of 
quantities, such as mass, volume, and utility, these 
were considered to be additive (confirmed experimen- 
tally). However, we now know that for all three a sub- 
additivity effect can be observed in certain circum- 
stances. Does this make these quantities more, or less, 
basic? Perhaps, but only in a particular context involv- 
ing theories ubject o revision. 
(ii) Similarly velocity, which was originally additive, is not 
additive if interpreted relativistically. This case, to- 
gether with the notorious non-additive quantity of 
temperature, may suggest a generalisation of the 
associative and commutative operation of concatena- 
tion of two objects. This is the more general property 
of bisymmetry (Ramsay, 1976). 
(a, oa : )o  (a3 oa4) = (al oa3) o (a2 oa4) 
which is a very general sort of 'averaging' property. It 
also covers the properties of resistance in parallelwiring 
and the alternative concatenation procedure for length. 
(iii) Originally it was thought hat any direct measurement 
was necessarily additive. The orthogonal (as opposed to 
linear) concatenation procedure for length shows that 
non-additive direct measurement is possible (Ellis, 
1960; Van Brakel and Van der Peut, 1979). The ortho- 
gonal concatenation procedure for length also generates 
alternative concatenation procedures for velocity, 
momentum and kinetic energy (in non-relativistic 
physics). 
(e) Moderate realism 
Realism is a view about a certain class of statements - 
for example, statements reporting the results of measure- 
ments. It is a semantic thesis: a thesis about what, in 
general, renders a statement in the given class true when it 
is true. Whether a statement is true or false depends on 
some reality that exists independently of our knowledge of 
it. This is so, independently of whether we know, or are 
even able to discover, its truth value. The realist position 
further entails (Byerly and Lazara, 1973; Dummett, 1982; 
Putnam, 1965): 
(1) Concepts in different theories may refer to the same 
thing. For example, temperature is defined by the 
mercury thermometer, temperature as occurring in the 
ideal gas law, temperature as defined in thermo- 
dynamics using Carnot cycles, temperature defined as 
molecular energy, temperature as ascribed to a collec- 
tion of (non-particulate) elementary magnets-spins, 
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and temperature interpreted as 'felt warmness', may all 
refer to the same thing. It makes sense to say we are 
referring to the same thing, notwithstanding the fact 
that some of our beliefs - even beliefs included in our 
scientific definition of the term ' temperature ' -may 
very likely turn out to be mistaken. 
(2) Physical magnitude terms are names of magnitudes. 
The term 'temperature' refers to a particular physical 
magnitude that exists in reality and which is responsible 
for differences in 'felt warmness', and for certain 
observations Galileo made. 
(3) Quantitative concepts have meaning completely apart 
from and independent of what measurement operations 
are available, or what the outcome of such measure- 
ment is. 
In general, a moderate realistic position gives priority to 
the question of what it means for a measurement s atement 
to be true, over and above the question of how we go about 
establishing its truth, or what kind of justification we can 
provide if we believe a measurement s atement to be true. 
As a methodological heuristic, realism combines (i) reduc- 
tion of arbitrariness and (ii) full awareness of theoretical 
context. This is to be counterbalanced by anti-funda- 
mentalism. Let me give a few illustrations of this: 
(i) If we assume that different concepts may refer to the 
same thing, this will counteract too much arbitrariness 
(Byerly and Lazara, 1973; Putnam, 1965). For 
example, it has been stated by instrumentalists and 
operationalists hat (i) if we choose temperature to be 
a linear function of a mercury column this is an arbi- 
trary choice, and (ii) the choice between PV = RTand 
PV = (exp)T is arbitrary. Now this may be so if we 
take the mercury scale or the ideal gas law in complete 
isolation. (In fact, it is trivial that if we remove all con- 
text everything becomes arbitrary.) But this is not so. 
We certainly can provide theoretical (although 
admittedly crude) justification for choosing a linear 
scale. Before we construct a scale we have knowledge 
about the properties of thermometric substances: 
bodies expand when heated; some do this more than 
others. Also we experience that equal increases of the 
length of a mercury column correspond to sensations of 
approximately equal temperature increases. And so on. 
Similarly for the ideal gas law. The variable T does not 
occur only in connection with experiments in which P 
and V of gas samples are measured - if that were the 
case there would be no need for T at all. We know 
various other (semi-) quantitative laws in which T 
occurs. All these temperature laws are tied by reference 
to the same quantity. Hence the mathematical form of 
all these laws is tied together as well. 
(ii) As has already been pointed out, we aim at a decrease 
of arbitrariness. For example, we consider the thermo- 
dynamic temperature scale as less arbitrary than a scale 
based on a thermometric substance, and we do this for 
good theoretical reasons. However, I think it is a sign 
of fundamentalism if we call the thermodynamic s ale 
an absolute scale. A.s Berka (1983) writes: "An arbi- 
trary zero as well as the absolute zero are theoretical 
constructs that are neither absolutely arbitrary nor 
absolutely natural". In particular in connection with 
the 'absolute zero' for temperature, very strong 
opinions have been expressed in the literature, for 
example : 
(a) The ideal gas scale cannot help having an absolute 
zero since it will not make sense to talk of cooling 
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a given mass of gas down by more degrees of 
temperature below 0°C than will reduce this pres- 
sure to zero (Ellis, 1966;Byerly and Lazara, 1973; 
Toulmin, 1960). But: what good reason is there to 
call this zero absolute and to capitalise this phrase? 
Why would the ideal gas law be valid at 'absolute 
zero' (after all, no gases exist at - 273.15°C)? 
(2) The whole structure of the science of thermo- 
dynamics would collapse without the existence of 
this (fixed, but unattainable) lower limit of 
temperature (Sommerfeld, 1956). But the science 
of thermodynamics did not collapse, nor did the 
concept of temperature fragment when the notions 
of negative, infinite, and hotter than infinite 
temperatures gained legitimacy in quantum statis- 
tical mechanics (Ehrlich, 1982). 
Perhaps you may object that it is impossible to talk 
about hotter than infinite temperatures. I would argue 
against hat as it being a fundamentalistic position forbid- 
ding certain lines of research. Whether it makes sense to 
refer to hotter than infinite temperatures or temperatures 
below absolute zero is a sophisticated subject of discussion 
in the foundation of quantum-statistical mechanics. Perhaps 
this approach leads to a 'less arbitrary' account of the con- 
cept of temperature. Whatever the outcome may be, it does 
not mean that the reference to the term 'temperature' will 
depend on it. 
Conclusion 
First, measurement is measurement-in-a-context. This 
context consists of our purpose; what we know; what we 
can do, the empirical world. 
Secondly, it follows that which rules of measurements 
are facts or norms depends on the whole theoretical back- 
ground we have rationally decided to adhere to. 
Thirdly, sensible guidelines for a theory of measurement 
are: reduce arbitrariness; no fundamentalism; do not be 
afraid of realism. 
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